Natural Selection: A Deselection vs Proselection Analysis by Raymond Hardy
 
Natural Selection: A Deselection vs Proselection Analysis 
 
Submitted to Nature, March 10, 2008 
 
 Evolutionists have been looking through the wrong end of the telescope since Darwin 
handed it to them front end first! 
 
 Les Dethlefsen, Margaret McFall-Nagi and David A. Relman1 repeated Wilson’s2 
repetition of Charles Darwin's3 error when they quoted Wilson’s article, “...individual types with 
the greatest reproductive success in a population increase in relative abundance...”  While I 
have taken this small part of the quotation out of context, the reader will soon see that doing so 
does not in any way affect the meaning or interpretation of the assertion for the purpose of the 
argument presented here. In brief, natural selection is not concerned with promoting the relative 
abundance of reproductively successful organisms. To believe that a form of favoritism is at 
work in natural selection, while intuitively satisfying, seriously undermines one’s ability to see 
the real underlying evolutionary dynamics.   
 
 In reality, evolution only ever DISFAVORS characteristics that interfere with the 
organism’s reproductive success.  
 
 At first blush one may mistakenly read this argument as being equivalent to saying that 
the statement “The quantity A is greater than the quantity B.” is quite different from saying  
“The quantity B is less than the quantity A.” However, while these two assertions are in fact 
logically equivalent, the assertion that natural selection works by “favoring” certain “individual 
types” is not logically equivalent to saying that natural selection works by “disfavoring” certain 
phenotypic characteristics. The two assertions are actually sufficiently different to produce 
dramatically different predictions and wildly different deductions based on the same objective 
data. 
 
 While I must leave it to the evolutionary biologists to flesh out this argument with the 
extremely rich array of supportive laboratory and field examples they can no doubt produce from 
memory alone, I can offer a few supportive arguments and insights. 
 
 One well known computer simulation that supposedly demonstrated the process of 
natural selection, described by Dawkins4 in his book, The Blind Watchmaker (1986) is a good 
starting point. The simulation produced the target phrase, “Methinks it is like a weasel.” from 
“random” mutations in only 164 trails. This rapid “evolution” process should have alarmed Dr. 
Dawkins as well as any evolutionary biologist who read Dawkin’s book, because the results 
make extremely clear the fact that the program is not an accurate simulation of evolution. 
Evolution simply does not happen that fast. So, what is wrong with Dawkins’ assumptions? 
Simply this, Dawkins’ simulation focused on “improvement.” Each time a trial led to a result 
that was closer to the ideal, that pattern served as the “parent” for the succeeding trials until a 
more favorable offspring was produced. In other words, improvement was favored. In order for 
improvement to be favored, one must know what and where the target is. If one’s goal is 
“perfection” then a selection process favoring improvement makes sense. But, is nature seeking 
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perfection? Is natural selection teleological? I think that even the creationists might balk at this! 
 
 We can fix Dawkins’ simulation. However, the fix is actually not very simple. In reality, 
nature does not seek perfection at all. She is much more forgiving than that. Organisms succeed 
or fail based only on their in-context viability. If an organism is not viable in its current context, 
or for a variety of possible reasons, can not reproduce, any unique genes it carries are lost, 
unless they arise or have arisen by mutation in another individual. I hope the reader won’t mind 
if I seem to be stating the obvious. An individual may carry a lethal gene and therefore not 
survive.  Or, an individual may carry a gene that prevents reproduction. These self-deselective 
genes are understandably rare, but they do continue to repeatedly arise by simple random 
mutation. Given this scenario, one must reprogram Dawkins’ simulation to deselect any 
non-viable results of a reproductive trial while allowing all of the rest of the offspring strings to 
continue to reproduce.  How do we decide what features will cause a given result to be 
non-viable? How does nature do this? Does the environment play a role? 
 
 By now the reader is beginning to realize that the deselection perspective offers a very 
rich array of theoretical variables for investigation. In order to specify deselection features, we 
need to think about the ecological niche the offspring live in. We need to think about the features 
of the offspring that make them likely to fail to survive. When this kind of consideration is 
brought into the simulation frame, we start getting a feel for the liveliness of the real 
natural-selection process. 
 
 Let us think of the goal sentence as a particular organism with particular features.  Let 
us begin by imagining a simpler goal. What if we were talking about a man who is “tall, dark, 
and handsome.” Would a short, dark, handsome man be deselected? What if the tall guy had flat 
feet? Would a short, blond, ugly man fail completely? What if he was really smart? But, yes, I 
am cheating. We started off with the tall, dark, handsome guy to simplify things. But, you can 
see how the specification of the features that make for success, or a goal state does not work.  
The more complex the organism, the less well such a model works. 
 
 So, back to Dawkins’ simulation. The sentence has six words. We could say that any 
offspring that has more than, say, ten words, could not survive. Then, of course, we must define 
what we mean by “word.” Let us say that a word is any string of letters that is bounded by a 
space at either end. In this simulation it is constructive to think of the words as analogous to 
organs in an organism. Each organ must meet certain minimal functional criteria in order for the 
organism to be viable. We could create similar criteria for each word in the offspring. We could 
specify a maximum and minimum number of letters. We could also specify for each word some 
lethal letters that would make the organ malfunction. We could build in some allowances as well. 
For example we could argue that a run of more than one space would simply count as a single 
space, since spaces merely separate words. When the deselective parameters of the simulation 
are thus specified, the resulting selection process takes many, many times longer than the 164 
trials required for Dawkins’ simulation to produce the target result. This should be readily 
apparent for anyone sitting in a comfortable armchair. 
 
 If this simple argument is not sufficient to convince the reader of the need to re-orient our 
evolutionary thinking, there are many, many more complex examples that may move things 
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along. The complex relationships between parasitism and mutualism discussed in Les Dethlefsen 
et al’s Nature article1 provide a great array of examples. Perhaps the mere existence of 
parasitism is enough. Consider this simple dynamic. When a parasite infects a host, if the 
parasite sufficiently weakens its host, both the host and the parasite die. If we think in terms of 
favored species or races, how does a parasite ever come into the picture? However, from a 
deselection perspective, if the parasite only kills most of its hosts while some of them survive, 
those hosts that survive may pass on their ability to withstand the rigors imposed by the parasite 
to their offspring and/or those parasites that are less demanding of their hosts may likewise pass 
on their characteristics. While most evolutionary biologists would argue that such parents and 
offspring are thus favored by natural selection, this is an inaccurate perspective. The fact is that 
those individuals are simply less likely to die before they reproduce. They are less likely to fail 
to reproduce. This would also be true for any member of the species that had not come into 
contact with the parasite. There are any number of ways to avoid deselection. If natural selection 
were favoring particular solutions to the problem, genetic diversity would swiftly be stifled. Life 
would swiftly vanish, or not really have begun at all. 
 
 On the other hand, we all know that mutualistic relationships are common among even 
simple organisms. It is easy to see that any organism that benefits from the work of an organelle 
is an example. Virtually all such mutualisms must have begun in the deep evolutionary past as 
parasite/host relationships. Natural selection then deleted those combinations that were too 
burdensome and allowed not just the best few adaptations, but all of those that were not 
sufficiently burdensome to prevent reproduction, to continue. As time passes, we discover an 
ever widening range of parasite/host adaptations some of which are much more beneficial than 
others, yet they all share the common feature of coexistence. Favortistic selection would not 
promote this kind of diversity. In fact, a deselection perspective encourages us to take a fresh 
look at organ systems since it is a failure of one or another of these that tends to deselect the 
organism whether before or after its reproductive activities. 
  
 For the sake of the science, especially now that we can read the genome, we need to start 
looking at this process from the correct end of the telescope.  When we do, we may come to the 
realization that it is more like a kalidascope than a telescope!  We will find it very useful to 
seek deselection features both within an organism’s genome or that of the species, and within the 
dynamism of the various niches that life has occupied during our brief evolutionary history.  
Exploring the fossil record for extinction-causing deselection events may help us avoid several 
that seem to be just over our own event horizon. 
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